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Notes Towards a Phenomenological Reading of Lacan 
 





Phenomenological psychotherapy, while critiquing psychoanalytic theories, has always sought to 
draw on and be inspired by these (and other) approaches. To read psychoanalysis through the 
lens of existential-phenomenology opens, deepens and perhaps even rehabilitates this body of 
work. In this paper, the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is explored through a 
phenomenological reading of his early work. Aspects of his developmental theory, as well as 
certain of his theoretical innovations, are related to psychopathology and treatment and are 
explored and understood in phenomenological terms. Emphasis is placed on psychotherapeutic 
experience and understandings. The paper argues that there is much of value in Lacan’s work 






Jacques Lacan’s work has since its inception been the 
target of much attack and even more perplexity, 
Lacan’s own personality arguably contributing to 
much of this confusion and rejection (Gurewich, 
1996; Plottel, 1985). The lack of translations and the 
density of the theory have kept Lacanian ideas from 
the English-speaking world until very recently (Moss, 
1990). Thus Lacan’s rich insights into the human 
condition have been largely ignored or gone 
unnoticed. Consequently, this paper’s aim is to 
explicate the theory of Jacques Lacan through a  
phenomenologically orientated lens of psychotherapy. 
Accordingly, the paper attempts to give an outline 
mainly of his early theories and to demonstrate how it 
is possible to ground this theory in lived-experience, 
and in particular that unusual experiential encounter 
commonly called ‘psychotherapy’.  
 
While reference will be made to a variety of sources 
below, the following were the main sources of my 
understanding of Lacanian theory, and would also 
serve as an ideal launching pad for those wishing to 
explore Lacan’s work in more detail. Good general 
introductions include Boothby (1991), Fink (1997), 
Gurewich (1996), Plottel (1985), Ragland-Sullivan 
(1987) and Thompson (1985), while more complex 
interpretations are provided by Eigen (1981), Fink 
(1995), Forrester (1987a, 1987b), Moss (1989, 1990) 
and Schneiderman (1993).  
 
It would be possible to trace Lacan’s intellectual 
influences to phenomenological sources (Boothby, 
1991). In this regard, Lacan was profoundly 
influenced by Heidegger, whom he met and invited to 
Paris, and later translated into French Heidegger’s 
article Logos (Roudinesco, 1997). The intellectual 
scene in Paris was particularly heavily existential and 
phenomenological, and this tradition was in many 
ways more mainstream than psychoanalysis at the 
time (ibid.). However, this tracing can be followed 
elsewhere (Boothby, 1991; Thompson, 1985), and 
instead we seek to discover in the theory itself aspects 
of lived experience which can be reclaimed as 
phenomenologically accurate. 
 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 6, Edition 1 May 2006  Page 2 of 9 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
Lacan builds his theories around a developmental 
sequence which is close to Freud, but which is 
innovatively informed by linguistics, structural 
anthropology and Hegelian philosophy (Fink, 1995). 
The exploration here will centre on reading the early 
theory of Lacan and will not explore his later ideas of 
‘mathemes’ or the ‘four discourses’ of Seminar XX. 
We will begin by exploring the development of 
subjectivity, followed by Lacan’s theory of Orders, of 
desire and the unconscious, and finally moving 
towards an understanding of psychopathology and 
treatment. 
 
The Developing Subject 
 
Lacan argues that the child is born pre-mature with 
very few instinctual responses, ‘at sea’ in its own 
helplessness (Fink, 1995; Ragland-Sullivan, 1987). It 
lacks motor-control and co-ordination, and thus 
experiences itself as a dis-unity of elements (parts). 
Coupled with this is its limited sensory experience 
(due to pre-mature birth), grounded mainly in vision 
and sound. Thus the child has limited capacities to 
perceive the world. These are, according to Lacan, 
restricted to: the gaze, the word, excrement and the 
breast (part-objects). Despite sensory awareness, the 
child is completely dependent in relation to feeding 
and protection on its caretakers - usually the mother. 
Mother is often written as (m)other to signify that the 
mother is the first other whom the infant encounters.  
 
The infant’s primordial experience of these part-
objects forms the nucleus of the primordial ego 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1987). This period lasts until 
approximately six months, which then heralds the 
start of the mirror stage. The child during this stage is 
completely dependent on the mother in every respect. 
The mirror stage entails an enhancement of psycho-
motor and perceptual abilities in the child. Because it 
experiences itself as a dis-unity, it sees in the 
(m)other the unity it can potentially be. Thus the 
infant begins to ‘mirror’ the (m)other and the mother 
also to ‘mirror’ the infant. Lacan uses the “mirror” as 
a metaphor to describe how the child identifies with 
the image it sees (as if it saw itself in a mirror), and 
this image thus generates a false sense of unity. It is 
interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty (1964) replied 
to Lacan (1977), and that Romanyshyn (2001) in turn 
replied to Merleau-Ponty, both from the perspective 
of phenomenology. In summary, the primordial ego, 
as essentially split and dis-unified, mis-recognises 
itself as unified, in the mirror that is the other.  
 
There is, despite the difficulties of the physical dis-
co-ordination, a sense purity of primordial experience 
during this early period (Fink, 1995), which is prior 
to the eventual alienation and castration which will 
follow. Thus there remains in the subject a deeply 
buried sense of nostalgia for this early period of 
experience. This nostalgia is often encountered in 
long-term psychotherapy, where it appears as 
‘regression’ or in what is traditionally seen (in object 
relations theory) as part-object images. For example, 
patients often dream of encountering dismembered 
parts of their and others’ bodies, coupled with 
feelings of peace or alarm. The affect is often a clue 
to whether this is a feeling of loss of subjectivity or a 
necessary moment of healing requiring a return to 
pre-subjective relating. 
 
The identification with the mirrored other thus 
disrupts the primordial experience of chaos - a result 
of pre-mature birth and helplessness - and replaces it 
with a false (mis-recognised) unity, based on the 
other. Thus the other becomes vital for all future 
senses of cohesion and stability. The primordial ego 
is thus composed of part-objects, yet falsely believing 
itself to be whole, and is intrinsically narcissistic -
caught up in its own image. Therefore the ego is a 
mis-recognised unity, narcissistic - built on part-
objects and mirror-image identifications. The 
Lacanian subject is thus conceived as being 
primordially split, yet defended against with a 
narcissistic ego based in the mirror of the other. The 
subject eventually comes to acquire and experience 
this structure of the ego as a ‘lack’, that is a feeling of 
incompleteness. Narcissism is ‘lack’ and it is an 
inescapable aspect of being human. 
 
‘Lack’, however, also arises from the separation from 
the mother, which Lacan calls castration (Fink, 
1995). The child during the mirror phase is still very 
dependent, and ‘fused’ with the mother, until 
approximately 18 months, which then sees the 
beginning of the Oedipal drama. During this period 
the child begins to separate from the (m)other, begins 
to acquire language, and notices the presence of the 
father. Thus there is a distinct interrelation involved 
in the traumatic separation that both the father and 
language herald. This ties together father, as well as 
culture and the law that he represents, and language 
with its own laws and cultural aspects (Boothby, 
1991). The experience of the trauma of separation is a 
metaphoric ‘castration of the subject’. This does not 
entail a loss of a literal penis, as much as a loss of the 
real mother or the loss of their symbiotic unity.  
 
The loss of the symbiotic union leads to the 
primordial desire to recapture this illusionary state of 
‘oneness’ that the subject had once shared with the 
mother. With the realisation that this state is lost, the 
subject becomes ‘as good as castrated’. Desire then 
becomes sublimated into other avenues, but these 
never satisfy, as the real cause of desire, forever lost, 
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cannot be re-found. This ‘lost object of desire’ is 
forever sought. Desire is central to Lacan’s theory of 
subjectivity. Desire, being Lacan’s interpretation of 
Freud’s wish fulfilment, seeks constant expression 
and knows no boundaries. 
 
Desire, a function central to all human 
experience, is the desire for nothing 
nameable. And at the same time this 
desire lies at the very origin of every 
variety of animation. (Lacan, 1991, p. 
223) 
 
As the subject is castrated, the mother then too 
becomes symbolised as ‘castrated’ - not because of 
her lack of a literal penis, but because she symbolises 
‘the lack’ that the child experiences in the trauma of 
the separation from her. She, and all women, are 
therefore always connected to loss, lack and 
castration. 
 
The entry of language itself also causes a loss - a loss 
of primordial experience (Boothby, 1991; Fink, 1995; 
Ragland-Sullivan, 1987). Once the child has acquired 
an ability to symbolise experience, through words, it 
is able to use this to replace experience with words as 
a form of repression. Language, however, can never 
capture a full sense of lived-experience, and thus, as 
the child proceeds to acquire and use language more 
fully, the more fully it is alienated from this primal 
experience of itself and the world. Language thus 
entails not just the loss of the mother, but also the 
increasing loss of primal experience. Lacan terms this 
loss alienation. 
 
The challenge is now to describe the consequences of 
the above sequence in more phenomenologically 
accurate terms. The Lacanian developmental 
sequence is not meant to describe a pathological 
sequence, although it is inherent in Lacan’s 
conception that mankind is doomed to a state that is 
forever split, alienated, castrated, narcissistic and 
destined to seek completion in the other, through 
desire. This is for Lacan an enterprise, which can 
never be completed, as desire can never be satiated.  
 
While inherently pessimistic, this description goes a 
long way towards allowing for an understanding of 
the ‘insecurity’ and ‘vulnerability’, which seems to 
underlie the experience of almost all patients, and 
even very well functioning individuals. This 
insecurity is often covered over (or defended against) 
by an inauthentic sense of competency, by a 
narcissistic sense of self.  This is not to say that all 
patients, or all mankind, are narcissistic in the 
psychiatric sense. But rather that a pervading sense of 
unease, insecurity and anxiety appears to be present 
in even well functioning individuals. This insecurity 
is, however, covered over by a false, imaginary sense 
of worthfulness. This ‘narcissism’ is also apparent in 
most serious character disorders, of the self-
pathological kind (Brooke, 1994), such as borderline 
and schizoid disorders, not to mention narcissistic 
disorders themselves, as well as in many forms of 
schizophrenia, grandiose delusions being a common 
symptom in psychotic disorders.  
 
The inherent nature, or pervasiveness, of this 
narcissistic structure to the ego, also accounts for the 
need in subjects to seek ‘others’ to bolster their sense 
of self.  Just as Narcissus required his reflected image 
- so individuals require ‘others’ to be that image, 
because it was this image of the other that was the 
foundation of their sense of self. In many ways the 
psychotherapist becomes a ‘polymorphous other’ 
which the patient engages with in typical ways. The 
resolution of these typically individual engagements 
is obviously what is at the heart of any therapy 
working with the ‘transference’. Psychotherapy 
works exactly because the therapist is ‘an other’ with 
whom the patient is compelled to engage. 
 
The Orders of Experience 
 
While it is not possible to give a full account of the 
Lacanian ‘orders’, the imaginary, the symbolic and 
the real, it is essential to have some understanding of 
these in any unpacking of Lacan’s theories. The 
subject may be defined as the knotting together of 
these orders (Fink, 1995; Ragland-Sullivan, 1987), 
where one order cannot appear alone, but always with 
at least one other order at play as well. The orders 
may perhaps be described as foundational ‘modes of 
engagement’ with the world, or lenses through which 
the world is experienced. The subject is founded in 
relation to these orders and is thus always engaging 
and relating to the world via them. 
 
The imaginary is grounded in primitive and 
primordial experience, which occurs prior to and 
during the mirror stage. In this period, the primordial 
ego is formed in connection to pre-mature birth, 
limited perceptual faculties and the vicissitudes of the 
real mother. These founding experiences are 
essentially imagistic in nature. The primordial ego is 
thus composed of and constituted by images - 
principally the image of the other - and is therefore 
fundamentally imaginary. Much of the theory 
developed by Melanie Klein and the post-Kleinians 
would describe imaginary functioning and is in many 
ways analogous to paranoid-schizoid functioning 
(Ragland-Sullivan, 1985). It should thus be apparent 
that behaviour on the imaginary plane, tied as it is to 
the ego, is also intrinsically narcissistic. 
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The symbolic order enters experience with the 
acquisition of language and resultant repression. 
There is a direct and irrevocable connection between 
symbolic capacity and language capacity, although 
paradoxically the ability to use language does not 
ensure a symbolic capacity (Segal, 1954). Lacan spent 
much of his endeavour expanding and describing the 
symbolic order, and to some extent, at least initially, 
saw liberation for the subject in a full submission or 
adoption of the symbolic order (Fink, 1997). The 
symbolic is also intrinsically related to cultural laws 
and history, all of which are subtly embedded in 
language, myth and social convention. 
 
The order of the real embraces all that falls outside 
the imaginary and symbolic orders. It does not refer 
to any sort of objective reality or to the Freudian 
reality principle. It is rather that realm of experience, 
which is not caught or encompassed by the imaginary 
or the symbolic. Being unable to metabolise 
experience, the real can indeed be traumatic. 
However, humans are compelled to add imaginary 
and/or symbolic colour to all real occurrences. Ellie 
Ragland-Sullivan (1987, p. 188) puts it thus: 
 
The Real itself is unmoveable and 
complete. But man’s interpretations of the 
Real are moveable. The latter combine 
language with “self”-experience. The 
resulting interpretations [thus] compose 
“reality”, but not the real.  
 
Accordingly, there is no “reality” or world that is not 
a subjective reality or a life-world, and human 
existence is intrinsically an interpretive being-in-the-
world. This conception of the subject betrays 
Lacan’s, often unacknowledged, Heideggerian 
heritage (Boothby, 1991). Once the subject has 
entered the symbolic register, contact with the real is 
no longer ‘purely’ possible. All experience is 
thereafter sifted through imaginary and symbolic 
filters. Any encounter with the real that cannot be 
interpreted or filtered becomes a trauma (Gurewich, 
1996). It is thus, strictly speaking, not possible to 
refer to the real as ‘a lens’ through which experience 
is filtered. In fact, the subject seeks never to 
encounter the real, but on occasion falls prey 
nonetheless. At that point, the experience is 
completely ‘unfiltered’, terrifying and traumatic. It 
could be seen, if we may stretch the lens metaphor, as 
a lens which screens out nothing, as a non-lens.  
 
We must now explore how these “orders” manifest 
themselves phenomenologically. To the practising 
psychotherapist they manifest most obviously in so-
called “transference-reactions” and in the style of 
speech employed by the patient. It is now well 
established that certain patients (often called schizoid, 
borderline, psychotic and so forth) manifest a gross 
inability to communicate and receive communications 
in contrast to other patients (mostly described as 
neurotic). These more disturbed patients, described 
accurately by Brooke (1994) as suffering from self-
pathology, often have difficulty in separating symbol 
and symbolised. Hanna Segal (1954) refers to this as 
‘symbolic equation’. In this form of communication 
there is a collapsing, a fusing, of symbol with that 
which is real (the object). Thus, in the transference, 
the therapist is not like the patient’s mother, but is the 
patient’s mother. Imaginary functioning and 
communicating is thus in ascendance, in control.  
Such patients find interpretations made by the 
therapist as useless, traumatic or punitive. These 
symbolic communications cannot be understood or 
properly integrated. These patients appear, however, 
to respond to the real presence of the therapist, or to 
the real containment of the therapy room (Khan, 
1978). 
 
It should be noted that only severely psychotic 
patients have no access to the symbolic register. And 
even well integrated patients may retreat to imaginary 
functioning at certain times. The utility of Lacan’s 
theory is in being able to detect the shifts in reaction 
and speech, which suggest a shift to another order or 
mode of engagement.  
 
The concept of the real, allows a better understanding 
of the different vicissitudes of reaction, effect and 
trauma which occur to people when experiencing 
similar real events. The real of events occurs not in 
isolation, but within the context of existing imaginary 
and symbolic matrices existing for individual 
subjects. For example, the effect of a missed therapy 
session would be experienced as more or less 
traumatic depending on the real effect of that event. 
Similarly, events such as incest, rape or violence 
impact on individuals differently, and, from the 
Lacanian perspective, this would be understood to be 
the result of the subject’s capacity to symbolically 
metabolise these various encounters with the real. If 
the subject cannot metabolise these events, then 
various defensive manoeuvres, or fantasies, are 
adopted to cope with the trauma. 
 
 
The Unconscious Structured Like a Language 
 
Commentators often try to summarise Lacan’s 
theories into his famous phrase that “the unconscious 
is structured like a language” (Boothby, 1991). While 
this may be Lacan’s most long-standing concern, it is 
not his most original insight, and, as Lacan (1977) 
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himself points out, this was Freud’s great discovery. 
What Lacan discovered was that the laws which 
Freud claimed ruled the unconscious, namely 
condensation and displacement, were identical to the 
linguistic laws of metaphor and metonymy 
respectively. Thus symptoms, or dream images, are 
over-determined nodal points that simultaneously 
point in many directions. So too are words, which 
alone have no meaning, but only derive meaning in 
relation to other words, both within a particular 
sentence, and within a particular language. Words, or 
signifiers, become the essential element in the 
language system for Lacan, just as symptoms or 
dream images were for Freud in the unconscious.  
 
It should be pointed out that in Lacanian terms 
‘signifier’ refers to more than a word or sign, and is a 
unit which connects other units in the signifying 
chain. The present interpretation, both of Freud and 
Lacan, is that signifiers are not merely connected in a 
linear chain, but in a matrix with many possible 
connections. The unconscious is thus interpreted to be 
a complex matrix of possible connections between 
signifiers, connected along a variety of axes. All these 
connections operate simultaneously both consciously 
and unconsciously to orientate us within the signifier 
matrix. The connections in the matrix exist along 
phonemic lines (words sounding similar), along 
semantic lines (words having similar meanings), 
along affective lines (connecting similar emotional 
states) and along the axes of the other senses (vision, 
touch, smell, taste and possibly balance). To illustrate 
this concept practically, let us imagine a patient who 
continues to use the word “robot”. Through the 
working of psychotherapy it eventually becomes 
apparent that, within the signifier matrix, this word is 
associated with “living in a automated, robot-like 
way, being not in control of life”, with loss, death and 
danger. Also apparent is that the patient’s mother was 
killed “when she jumped the ‘robot-ic’ traffic lights” 
and was involved in a motor vehicle accident. This 
loss had long-standing effects on the patient, which 
left him “alone and isolated”. To some degree his 
inability to succeed at work, with his rejection of 
technological innovation, is also connected to the 
dangerous signifier “robot”. 
 
It is not possible here to do full justice to Lacan’s 
treatment of language. Lacan, it may be argued, never 
succeeded in unlocking the unconscious as language. 
Indeed his later excursions into set theory and what 
he described as “mathemes” appears to be an attempt 
on his part to create a language, not unlike that 
attempted by Bion, to describe both the functioning of 
language and the unconscious.   
 
Demanding to be Needed and Desired 
 
Lacanian theory attempts to overcome neo-Freudian 
‘drive theory’, with an appeal to an interpretation 
centred on need, demand and desire (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1987).  In terms of the Lacanian orders, 
need is real, demand imaginary, and desire symbolic 
(Forrester, 1987a). John Forrester points out that 
Lacan criticised 
 
those versions of psychoanalytic theory 
which equate Freud’s concept of drives 
with biologically determined need, 
arguing instead that the true realm of 
psychoanalytic action is the world of 
desire, which is created by language 
transforming need into desire in answer to 
the unsatisfiable demands of the (m)other. 
(p. 73) 
 
This is interpreted to mean that, although need may 
have an origin which is biologically real, the ‘true’ 
work of therapy revolves around desire created out of 
the intersubjective context. Desire, which has its 
origins in the other, mediated by the symbolic, and 
which arises in relation to the therapist (as 
transference), is what is worked through in a 
successful psychotherapy. 
 
Lacan describes desire as arising from castration, 
lack and alienation, which is the residue of the mirror 
stage and Oedipal separation. The subject attempts to 
overcome lack and castration by desiring to fill a 
‘hole’ or ‘gap’ left by the now separated mother. But 
this desiring also has its origins in the traumatic 
creation of the narcissistic ego.  
 
Desire is a relation of being to lack. This 
lack is the lack of being properly 
speaking. It isn’t the lack of this or that, 
but lack of being whereby the being 
exists.  (Lacan, 1991, p. 223) 
 
Lacan is here alluding to that which simultaneously 
creates the ego and desire - traumatic separation from 
the mother. The human being exists because of the 
separation - but a primordial ‘non-dual Being-ness’ is 
lost. The subject does not come into being until there 
is the traumatic separation (Fink, 1995). 
 
Lacan argues that desire is “a function central to all 
human experience, is the desire for nothing nameable. 
And at the same time this desire lies at the very origin 
of every variety of animation” (1991, p. 223). Desire 
can never be captured or contained, and forever 
weaves beyond analytical grasp. Desires ‘slide’ from 
one signifier to the next in a never-ending signifying 
chain. However, it is the project of psychotherapy to 
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attempt to name this desire, however long and 
arduous this attempt may be. “That the subject should 
come to recognise and to name his desire, that is the 
efficacious action of analysis” (Lacan, 1991, pp. 228-
229). That the subject should come to name his desire 
for psychotherapy to be successful! But it should be 
stated that a Lacanian conception of “cure”, true to its 
psychoanalytic foundation, sees this ‘naming’ as 
occurring in relation to the therapist - that is, it is the 
naming of transference desire.  
 
The Lacanian Conception of Psychopathology and 
Psychotherapy 
 
Having discussed the foundational concepts which 
Lacan introduced, let us now apply these concepts to 
human suffering and our attempts to alleviate it 
through psychotherapy. To begin with, it should be 
apparent that Lacan’s concept of the subject as split, 
castrated, alienated, narcissistic and ‘desiring that 
which will never satisfy’, indicates that he sees all 
humanity as suffering in their subjectivity. Indeed, it 
is a vision of humanity which is less than optimistic. 
As we shall be culminating our dialogue of ideas in 
this section, it would be prudent to outline how 
psychopathology is understood in phenomenological 
terms, and to see whether a parallel with Lacanian 
ideas can be sustained. 
 
Taking our lead from Heidegger, Binswanger, Boss 
and van den Berg, we may describe human existence, 
Dasein, as the world disclosing possibility of being. 
Existence is a being-in-the-world. In this regard, 
individuals are partially free to take up various 
possible ways of inhabiting (or not inhabiting) the 
world.  Psychopathology is thus seen as the 
truncation or avoidance of possible world 
engagements. Psychotherapy serves, through the 
authentic presence of the psychotherapist, to engage 
the patient in new possible ways of inhabiting and 
being in the world. The word (as speech, language 
and dialogue) exists in this encounter not merely as a 
way to connect the participants, “but rather it is the 
constitution of our being together in a shared world” 
(Kruger, 1984, p. 233). It is, in fact, impossible to 
imagine a shared existence (mit-sein) without 
language. It constitutes both a great amount of our 
world-relatedness and the means to our healing this 
relation. But ultimately it is ‘the world’ that heals. As 
Kruger makes clear, it “is not the words that heal, but 
the world that is called into presence by the word. For 
the client, such a world has always been a possible 
world but has never been appropriated” (1984, p. 
233). 
 
Before proceeding to dialogue these different 
approaches, it is appropriate to sketch a brief outline 
of a Lacanian approach to psychopathology. Severe 
pathology, such as psychosis or self-pathologies, 
would be seen as a fixation in, or regressive return to, 
real-imaginary functioning and relating - this being a 
form of relating which is non-symbolic. The 
psychotic relates to words, ideas and thoughts ‘as if’ 
they were real. Words become literal ‘things’, 
thoughts become actual ‘voices in the head’ and ideas 
become ‘the truth’. Healing would thus be the 
development of an authentic symbolic function, thus 
the creation of repression, and a transformation of 
imaginary relating into more symbolic relating. 
 
Less severe pathology, or neurotic pathology, would 
be seen as an excessive use of repression or the 
defensive use of the symbolic. Thus healing resides in 
realising the use of repression, and hence a realisation 
of the freedom inherent in the possible use of 
language. The symbolic is thus re-claimed, or re-
appropriated, made more free and becomes usable in 
a variety of ways, which are closer to ‘play’ than 
adherence. The neurotic may be seen as a subject who 
‘adheres’ to the strictures of the ‘symbolic law’, 
rather than living them metaphorically. This leaves 
little room for ambiguity, paradox or mystery. 
 
Lacanian psychotherapy is essentially the ‘languaging 
of the unconscious’. It is healing through speech and 
relating with an other, who must be present otherwise 
speech is not possible - a true “talking cure” - and is 
thus an alteration of speech and relating (Lacan, 
1977). The analysis is over when a full entry into the 
symbolic is attained and when the subject relates to 
the therapist, through the transference, about himself. 
As the Lacanian analyst Stuart Schneiderman puts it, 
the “patient ought to reach a point where he 
articulates the signifiers that inscribe him in the real 
and determine his destiny” (1993, p. 6). The 
signifiers, housed, as it were, in the unconscious, 
determine the relating to other signifiers. It is only by 
adding more signifiers to the matrix that the power of 
particular connections is undone. Speech adds 
signifiers to the matrix, speech grounded in a relating, 
which is safe, containing and supportive. Thus the 
signifiers added to the matrix are related, along the 
affective axis, to safety and ‘love’.  Thus the effects 
of signifiers, which may be related to fear, hatred, or 
loss, for example, are now reduced in intensity by 
their new association to love and safety. 
 
Desire, central to subjective action, needs to reach 
towards being made symbolic to free the subject from 
the tyranny of repetition. It is in the talking and 
enactment, through transference, that the subject 
discovers his true desires. Desire, which is ultimately 
unconscious, cannot, however, emerge merely by an 
act of will. It comes to the surface often only through 
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action and interaction, and appears in psychotherapy 
as transference. Here it meets not with literal 
satisfaction, but with interpretation. It meets with 
speech through a relating. This relating is not just to 
the therapist as other, but a relating to the 
unconscious as Other as well. As Lacanian analyst 
Bruce Fink (1995) observes, there is almost a moral 
aspect to the type of subjectivity which analysis seeks 
to bring forth. It is morally obligated to the Other, as 
symbolic and as unconscious. Lacan re-interprets 
Freud’s dictum “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” - 
commonly interpreted as “Where id was, let ego be” - 
as “I must come to be where foreign forces - the 
Other as language and the Other as desire - once 
dominated” (Fink, 1995, p. 68). Psychotherapy thus 
becomes a reclamation of being, which pays equal 
homage to the mysteries of others, language, ‘the 
world’ and the self. 
 
It is here that we start to see the emergence of 
common themes. For the phenomenologist, it is 
encountering ‘the world’ which is paramount, while 
for Lacan it is the Other, remembering that for Lacan 
‘the Other’ has multiple signification. But whether 
‘world’ or ‘Other’, the patient is drawn away from 
their difficulties being somehow located inside 
themselves. These sufferings are constituted in the 
world/Other and are ultimately healed by the 
world/Other. While for Lacan language was the 
primary constituent force of the Other, and is 
certainly important for phenomenologists, there is a 
major difference of emphasis. For existential-
phenomenologists language brings individuals 
together and constitutes this togetherness (Kruger, 
1984). But language also mirrors the metaphorical 
nature of psychological experience (Romanyshyn, 
2001), and healing occurs through languaging of 
distress, through story telling and through realising 
the metaphorical, imaginative nature of existence. 
Language is therefore a via regina, a medium towards 
an end. It would seem for Lacan, however, that 
language has been idealised beyond medium, and has 
been elevated to almost divine status. For the early 
Lacan, language alienates, but also contains the 
possibility of liberation. Both approaches tussle with 
language, this thorniest of issues, and in this struggle 
lessons can be learnt.  It is however beyond the scope 
of this paper to fully explore this issue here. Putting 
this debate aside, perhaps it would instructive at this 
point to sketch, using an outline presented by Ellie 
Ragland-Sullivan (1987), how a phenomenologically 
sensitive Lacanian psychotherapy may progress. 
 
In the early stages, the therapist attempts to engage 
and contain the patient, often coming to be being seen 
as an ideal person. In many ways, this process 
recapitulates the mirror phase, and in this manner the 
narcissistic resources of the patient are restored and 
replenished.  Strong ego resources are established and 
hopefully retained for the more challenging 
therapeutic work which will follow. This phase may 
be seen as predominantly non-verbal, and, as in the 
mirror stage, relies more on the visual and emotional 
‘presence’ of the therapist. How the therapist inhabits 
the therapeutic space becomes all-important. What is 
said is often less important than how it is said. This is 
particularly important with more disturbed clients, 
while those with less disturbance will move into, or 
even begin in the second stage of placing a ‘demand’ 
on the therapist, specifically the demand ‘to know’. 
 
This initial phase leads to a phase of idealisation, 
where the therapist is seen as ‘the subject who is 
supposed to know’, as Lacan puts it. This phase 
entails attempts by the patient to get the therapist ‘to 
give in’ or capitulate in a variety of ways - in essence, 
to engage the patient in his or her usual, pathological 
modes of relation. This may entail direct demands for 
‘answers’ or more subtle demands for the therapist to 
take up particular positions (aggressive, submissive, 
mothering, and so forth) in relation to the client. 
When this does not occur, the ideal unity of the 
patient-therapist unity is disrupted, much as the 
symbiosis of mother and child is disrupted with the 
advent of alienation and castration. 
 
How the patient deals with this separation, with the 
disillusionment that the therapist is not the ‘perfect 
being’ perceived in the previous stages of the therapy, 
then becomes crucial. Only if the patient has the ego-
resources, inherent or created through the earlier 
stages of the therapy, can this stage be survived. Trust 
in the process and in the therapist is vital. The 
therapist must also be able to survive the narcissistic 
disillusionment and rage which may accompany this 
traumatic separation. Thus, in many ways, the patient 
re-experiences castration, but this time the therapist 
is able to allow this process to be lived more 
symbolically, allowing the patient to metabolise the 
process, and to take up another way of being. 
 
Later the patient must transform his or her 
relationship to the world. This may become a 
submission to the world/Other, the realisation that 
he/she is founded on the Other, as mother, language, 
unconscious, God, and that the subject needs to live 
within such a constituted world which is also founded 
on these Others. In this stage, the symbolic may be re-
appropriated and lived less literally and more 
metaphorically. This is also a realisation of the 
freedom of this way of being. The symbolic thus 
becomes a meaning-world, an imaginative place in 
which play becomes not only a possibility, but almost 
an imperative. 
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To summarise, a re-establishment of mirror stage 
functioning allows for the creation of demand and 
desire (or transference) in the therapeutic space.  This 
desire is met with words and reflections as well as 
interpretations, which re-creates the castration and 
alienation to which the patient is already subject, but 
which is now worked through and assimilated 
symbolically. Overall, the subject moves from 
relating to the other (the actual person of the 
therapist) to the Other (‘the world’, language, the 
unconscious, and so forth). The subject is now no 
longer ‘subjected to the unconscious’, but now stands 
in a new relation to this world/Other, a relation which 
is less of a captivation and more of a respectful 
appreciation for the power and pervasiveness of this 
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